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The European Arrest Warrant:
Between Trust, Democracy and the Rule of Law
Introduction.
The European Arrest Warrant: Extradition in Transition
Elies van Sliedregt
The Framework Decision to establish the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) en-
tered into force on 1 January 2004. Since the adoption of the Italian law on 22
April 2005 transposing the Decision, it has been operational throughout the Eu-
ropean Union. In its evaluation report of January 2006, the European Commis-
sion welcomes the arrest warrant as an ‘overall success’, as it provides for an effective
and swift surrender procedure whilst guaranteeing judicial control and the obser-
vation of fundamental rights. National evaluation reports, such as the 30th report
of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, show that the
arrest warrant is widely used to secure the arrest and surrender across the Union.
The European Arrest Warrant seems to have largely taken over traditional extradi-
tion procedures.
This overall positive appraisal does not detract from the fact that, in its appli-
cation, the Eurowarrant has encountered serious problems. Three national courts
have declared the implementation of the Framework Decision unconstitutional
for not respecting the limitation or prohibition of the extradition of nationals.1
Moreover, EAW implementing legislation and court decisions have created ob-
stacles to co-operation under the Arrest Warrant scheme, obstacles that appear
incompatible with the Framework Decision. As a result, applying the new scheme
of judicial co-operation has not resulted in a definite farewell to classic extradi-
tion.
These developments raise fundamental issues, three of which deserve atten-
tion. Firstly, the implementation and application of the Eurowarrant has worked
as a catalyst; it has forced several national courts to take position on the relation-
ship between national (constitutional) law and (secondary) third pillar law. These
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1 See, Editorial ‘Mutual Trust’, 2 EuConst (2006) p. 1-3.
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positions differ from one another as will be shown below. Secondly, the imple-
mentation and application of the Arrest Warrant give reason to believe that there
is a lack of trust between EU member states when co-operating in criminal mat-
ters. The constitutional rulings can be considered evidence of reservations to mutual
trust. Court decisions and EAW implementing legislation with regard to refusal
grounds may equally be regarded as expressions of ‘distrust’. This touches upon
the third, closely connected, matter: the issue of rights and refusal grounds. Re-
spect for the requested person’s human rights (right to family life, right to work)
may preclude his/her surrender by allowing reliance on a humanitarian/hardship
refusal ground. This is noteworthy since reliance on such a refusal ground is remi-
niscent of the ‘classic’ extradition scheme and was expected to disappear, or at
least to be limited, in the ‘EAW era’.
Constitutional rulings and contrapunctual principles
On 27 April 2005, the Polish Constitutional Court held that the European Arrest
Warrant breached the constitutional ban on extraditing Polish nationals to the
authorities of another member state. Only three months later, in July 2005, the
German Federal Constitutional Court annulled Germany’s law transposing the
Framework Decision because it did not adequately protect German citizens’ fun-
damental rights, a condition which is required for the extradition of German
nationals. In response to this decision and by applying the principle of reciprocity,
the Spanish authorities then decided that they would no longer surrender nation-
als to Germany. In a decision of 7 November 2005, the Supreme Court of Cyprus
found that the European Arrest Warrant violates a clause in the Constitution
prohibiting citizens from being transferred abroad for prosecution, however, the
European Arrest Warrant did survive a challenge in the Czech Constitutional
Court. The Court found a way to interpret national law in conformity with the
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant.
While some of the court decisions on the constitutionality of EAW imple-
menting legislation lead to the same result, the reasoning reflects different ap-
proaches. Komárek, writing on European constitutionalism and the European
Arrest Warrant, analyzes these different approaches by using Maduro’s contra-
punctual principles.2  Maduro’s view of a pluralist legal order is built on the premise
that no court should assume supremacy of its legal order. Instead, courts should
seek consistency and coherence in the whole of the European legal order. This
2 J. Komárek, ‘European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: in search of
the limits of “contrapunctional principles”’, 44 CML Rev. (2007) p. 9-40. Referring by analogy to
the musical method of harmonizing different melodies that are not in a hierarchical relationship
inter se.
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would require judges to look beyond specific constitutional provisions and Euro-
pean Union law to find a fit with European Court of Justice decisions and other
national court decisions. In essence, it requires national judges to act on behalf of
the European legal order in addition to their own.
Examining the constitutional rulings in the light of the contrapunctual prin-
ciples, which may also be referred to as a theory of judicial tolerance or judicial
dialogue, we see a difference between the approach of the German Federal Con-
stitutional Court and that of the Polish Constitutional Court. As Komárek points
out, the German judges did not take into account the possible consequences of
their decision on the European level. They did not even consider the ECJ’s ruling
in Pupino, although that judgment had been issued only a month before.3  The
Polish court, on the other hand, in declaring the implementing law unconstitu-
tional, referred to the wider context of the Framework Decision and urged the
legislator to move towards a more advanced level of co-operation in criminal mat-
ters; this would allow realization of the Union’s aims and strengthen Polish inter-
nal security.4
Leaving aside other relevant factors, such as the compatibility of the imple-
menting legislation with the Framework Decision and the discretion it leaves courts
to interpret its wording, it suffices at this point to conclude that different ap-
proaches exist to constitutional conflicts brought about by the application of the
Eurowarrant. On the one hand, there is the national supremacy approach, repre-
sented by the German Federal Constitutional Court ruling, and, on the other
hand, there is the approach that attempts to pay heed to European and other
member states’ interests represented by the Polish Constitutional Court.
It seems obvious that European interests are served best when national (consti-
tutional) courts renounce the idea of national supremacy. This, however, may be
too much to ask when it concerns co-operation in criminal matters. After all, the
interests are weighty and are not adequately protected in the context of the third
pillar with its democratic deficit and imperfect judicial control. Surrender pro-
ceedings may lead to the handing over of an individual – be it a national or not –
for the purpose of prosecution or execution of a custodial sentence. One could
argue that under such circumstances the theory of judicial dialogue should not
play a dominant role and that individual concerns may be equally or more impor-
tant. For the same reason one can imagine that national extradition surrender
3 C. Tomuschat, ‘Inconsistencies – The German Federal Constitutional Court on the Euro-
pean Arrest Warrant’, 2 EuConst (2006) p. 209-226.
4 See A. Lazowski, ‘Poland. Constitutional Tribunal on the Surrender of Polish Citizens Un-
der the European Arrest Warrant. Decision of 27 April 2005’, 1 EuConst (2005) p. 569-581.
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courts are reluctant to adopt a ‘European approach’ towards implementing legis-
lation of EAW the Framework Decision for instance, by refusing to interpret EAW
implementing legislation in conformity with the Framework Decision. After all,
conform interpretation with regard to the European Arrest Warrant is likely to
emphasize the interest of the issuing member state rather than the interest of the
individual concerned. The EAW Framework Decision, drawn up in the aftermath
of the 9/11 attacks, breathes efficiency and expediency as a result of member
states’ desire for an informal and swift cross-border transfer of suspected persons.
Reluctance to adopt a ‘European approach’ in EAW cases is not generally re-
flected in current practice. Two rulings by the House of Lords may serve to illus-
trate this. On 17 November 2005 in the case of Armas, the House of Lords did
not refuse to execute a Belgian arrest warrant for people trafficking, an offence
which had partly taken place in the United Kingdom. While the specific provi-
sions of the Extradition Act 2003 do not allow for extradition/surrender for of-
fences that have been partly committed in the United Kingdom, the House of
Lords ‘repaired’ this by a purposive reading of the Statute, which, it held, was
instrumental in implementing the spirit and requirements of the Framework De-
cision. It was felt that poor drafting was not an obstacle to meeting obligations
under the Framework Decision. As Baroness Hale held, ‘it would be most unfor-
tunate if the judicial authorities in our European partner states, using the form of
warrant prescribed by the Framework Decision, were to find that the English
judicial authorities were unable to implement it.’
In the recent case of Dabas, the Law Lords adopted a similar approach to the
question whether the arrest warrant requires the issuing of a certificate as provided
for in section 64(2)(b) and (c) of the Extradition Act 2003. Relying on Pupino5
and on the purpose of the EAW Framework Decision, the majority dismissed the
appeal since it would, in the words of Lord Bingham, reintroduce ‘an element of
technicality’. Dissenter Lord Scott found his noble and learned friends ‘reading
down’ provisions of the Extradition Act and removing from it a provision that
Parliament thought right to include for the protection of the requested person.
Mutual trust
Paragraph 10 of the preamble to the Framework Decision on the European Arrest
Warrant reads: ‘The mechanism of the European arrest warrant is based on a high
level of confidence between Member States. Its implementation may be suspended
5 See E. Spaventa, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box: Some Reflections on the Constitutional Effects of
the Decision in Pupino’, 3 EuConst (2007) p. 5-24.
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only in the event of a serious and persistent breach by one of the Member States of
the principles set out in Section 6(1) of the Treaty of the European Union.’
International co-operation in criminal matters requires trust in another state’s
criminal justice system. Such trust is often presumed when an extradition treaty
exists. In the words of Justice Holmes in the Glucksman v. Henkel case, ‘we are
bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be
fair’. However, no rule of international law obliges states to trust another State
blindly and to co-operate with it unconditionally. In fact, many states have lim-
ited their co-operation under extradition treaties by adopting declarations, reser-
vations and refusal grounds so they can demand guarantees and safeguards before
agreeing to extradite a person. Ne bis in idem, in absentia trials, prosecution of
minors, these are all grounds upon which to base a refusal to co-operate. This
widespread practice of reservations and refusal grounds indicates that Parties to an
extradition treaty retain their sovereignty to a certain extent. Moreover, such prac-
tice belies the idea that concluding an extradition treaty implies unlimited trust in
another state’s criminal justice system.
Mutual trust, or ‘a high level of confidence’, has been a key notion underlying
the system of co-operation in criminal matters in the European Union. Mutual
trust was referred to by the Council of the European Union as the ‘bedrock’ of the
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant. It provides the basis for
mutual recognition, which in turn is considered to be the ‘cornerstone’ of EU
judicial co-operation in criminal matters. In the context of the Arrest Warrant,
mutual trust has been the reason for abolishing the double criminality rule for a
number of crimes and for removing the executive from the decision-making pro-
cess. However, it has not resulted in eliminating refusal grounds, as will appear
below. How can this be explained?
The problem with ‘mutual trust’ as the precondition for the adoption of a
norm or for the establishment of a relationship is that it is a static notion and
tends towards the absolute. In reality, trust is not absolute and it is both the prod-
uct and the condition of a regularly sustained communication. The EAW scheme
introduces a new co-operation and communication scheme and takes time to
adjust to. Direct communication between judicial authorities differs fundamen-
tally from communication between government authorities on a case-by-case ba-
sis, as was the usual practice under the extradition scheme. Moreover, courts need
to adjust to their new role of being solely responsible for scrutinizing surrender
proceedings. In the process of creating a new co-operation scheme, it is no won-
der that the familiar techniques of reservations and refusal grounds are relied upon.
The question is whether these techniques should be viewed as expressions of sov-
ereignty, as distrust in another state’s criminal justice system, or as a means of
Elies van Sliedregt
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communication that builds mutual understanding. This brings us to the third
connected theme, that of individual rights and refusal grounds.
Rights and refusal grounds
As said, mutual trust has not led to a drastic limitation of refusal grounds. In fact,
the refusal grounds listed in the Framework Decision on the European Arrest
Warrant reflect grounds of refusal that feature in extradition treaties and national
extradition acts. In that sense, there is still room for ‘distrust’. There is, however,
one important difference: refusal grounds are relied upon by the courts. The Euro-
warrant scheme makes judicial authorities solely responsible for surrendering in-
dividuals to other member states; a responsibility they (used to) share with the
executive with regard to extradition. It is interesting to see that the shift in deci-
sion-making from government authorities to judicial authorities has led some
courts to be more vigorous in scrutinizing the surrender proceedings, as if to com-
pensate for a potential loss of rights of the requested person in an efficient and
accelerated surrender procedure. The German Constitutional Court decision may
be understood against that background, as may the transposed legislation of sev-
eral member states and certain court decisions that provide for refusal grounds
that do not feature in the Framework Directive.
In November 2006, the Netherlands Supreme Court quashed three decisions
of the Surrender/extradition Chamber of the Amsterdam District Court. In each
of these cases, the chamber had refused to execute an arrest warrant and subse-
quently surrender the requested person on the basis of ‘humanitarian reasons’.
The Dutch law transposing the EAW Framework Decision – the Surrender Act –
does not specifically provide for such a refusal ground. Instead, the surrender
chamber based its refusal on Section 13 of the Surrender Act, which more or less
reproduces Section 4(7)(a) of the Framework Decision, and provides for the pos-
sibility to refuse the execution of a warrant in case the European Arrest Warrant
relates to an offence that was committed in whole or in part on territory of the
executing member state (i.e., Dutch territory). The application of this ‘territorial
exception’ may be renounced upon request by the Dutch prosecutor but only
when such request is ‘reasonable’. In other words, when the request is deemed
‘unreasonable’, the Surrender Chamber may refuse execution of the warrant. The
chamber understood ‘unreasonable’ to include reasons of a humanitarian nature.
When the requested person’s personal situation (family, job, health) requires him/
her to stay in the Netherlands, a request by the prosecutor not to refuse the surren-
der despite the fact that (part of ) the conduct has been committed in the Nether-
lands must be dismissed.
This reasoning was not acceptable to the Supreme Court. The Court held that
the legislator never intended to include a hardship/humanitarian refusal ground
The E ropean Ar est Warrant: Introduction
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in Section 13. The ‘unreasonable’ clause only concerns prosecutorial matters: in
situations where all the evidence is in the issuing State, such as witnesses and co-
accused, the territorial exception of Article 13(1) may not be invoked. The Su-
preme Court further held that Section 13(2) of the Surrender Act cannot be
regarded as the equivalent of Section 10(2) of the Extradition Act that does pro-
vide for a humanitarian refusal ground. The Framework Decision (Section 24(2))
and the transposed Surrender Act (Article 35(3)) only allow for humanitarian
reasons to delay surrender proceedings, not to refuse it.
The Surrender Chamber had been creative in inserting a humanitarian refusal
ground into the Surrender Act. By analogy with Section 10(2) of the Extradition
Act, it enabled refusal on ‘humanitarian grounds’. The provision that delays sur-
render proceedings was not considered to sufficiently deal with situations of hard-
ship. The requested person may suffer from a long-term disease such as AIDS or
cancer, a situation that will continue and worsen rather than improve, making the
refusal of surrender even more pertinent. The Supreme Court, however, pointed
out that the Dutch legislator did not intend to include such a ground in the
Surrender Act and that Article 13 may not function as such. This leaves unan-
swered the question of whether the Framework Decision provides for a humani-
tarian refusal ground. The answer seems to be in the negative. The fact that the
Framework Decision provides for a delay in surrender proceedings rather than a
definite refusal may a contrario mean that the member states did not intend to
include such a refusal ground. This reading is supported by comments of the
Commission in its report evaluating the European Arrest Warrant where it criti-
cizes Italy for introducing grounds of refusal concerning the personal and family
situation of the individual in question while such a refusal ground is not provided
for in the Framework Decision. On the other hand, one could argue that the
humanitarian refusal ground can be based on principles of Community law, such
as the proportionality principle or on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Be
that as it may, what the above goes to show is that judicial authorities may be
inclined to adopt a more vigorous test of surrender proceedings than allowed for
under the European Arrest Warrant scheme, simply because they are the ones
solely responsible. Taking out the executive may be more efficient and expedient;
it may also have the (adverse) effect of a more vigorous examination of surrender
proceedings.
On 3 May 2007, the European Court of Justice ruled on the first preliminary
reference on the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant.6  The
preliminary ruling was asked for by the Belgian Court of Arbitration upon com-
plaint by the organization Advocaten voor de Wereld. The latter argued that (i) the
6 ECJ Case C-303/05, 3 May 2007.
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European Arrest Warrant should not have been regulated by means of a Frame-
work Decision but instead by a convention, and (ii) that the Framework Decision
violates the principles of equality and non-discrimination as well as the principle
of legality by abolishing the requirement of double-criminality assessment for the
criminal offenses listed under Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision.
The Court rejected both arguments. Addressing the first argument, the Court
ruled that it us up to the Council of the European Union to choose the instru-
ments by which it wishes to legislate in fields previously governed by international
conventions. The Court further pointed out that, according to Article 31(1)(a)
and (b) EU Treaty, the Council is not bound to resort to any specific legal instru-
ment in striving for ‘closer cooperation between judicial and other authorities of
the Member States in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 (EU) and 32
(EU)’. With regard to the question of equality and non-discrimination, the Court
held that the ‘inequality’ was justified since the 32 categories of offences on the
list ‘feature among those the seriousness of which in terms of adversely affecting
public order and safety justifies dispensing with the verification of double crimi-
nality’7.  Finally, the Court held that Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision does
not violate the principle of legality. The list of Article 2(2) only provides for cat-
egories of offences whilst ‘the definition of those offences and of the penalties
applicable continue to be matters determined by the law of the issuing member
state’8.  In other words, it is only at state level that the principle could be in-
fringed.
The ruling is hardly unexpected. The complaint by the Advocaten voor de Wereld
was not targeting the real problems of the Framework Decision on the European
Arrest Warrant. It would be interesting to hear the Court’s view on refusal grounds
and their (in)compatibility with the Framework Decision, particularly with re-
gard to the hardship/humanitarian refusal ground as discussed above. The Court’s
ruling may, however, be welcomed for the attention it draws to the ‘legal protec-
tion side’ of the European Arrest Warrant, which until now has been overshad-
owed by the efficiency and expediency concerns that played such an important
role in drafting the Framework Decision.
Concluding observations
What the above illustrates is that it is hard to say goodbye to extradition. Provid-
ing for additional refusal grounds in transposed legislation (Italy) or in case-law
(the Dutch court decisions) and adhering to the reciprocity principle (Spain with
regard to German refusal to surrender national) leaves member states room to
7 Ibid., para. 57.
8 Ibid., para. 53.
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retain their sovereignty and to refuse to execute a European Arrest Warrant. The
EAW scheme may be built on ‘mutual trust’; like extradition, this does not imply
unconditional trust. The European Arrest Warrant for all its innovations may still
be regarded as extradition, albeit in a more expedited and dressed-down form.
With these observations, I would like to introduce a series on the European
Arrest Warrant. The focus of the series will be on the different approaches na-
tional courts have towards the EAW. Whether we call the approach ‘contrapunctual’
or ‘European’, whether it concerns constitutional courts or surrender/extradition
courts, it is clear that different courts adopt different attitudes to co-operating
under the European Arrest Warrant scheme. Padfield, in this issue, will discuss the
House of Lords approach. The articles in the series will further examine trans-
posed legislation, its compatibility with the Framework Decision and its constitu-
tionality on the national level.
Elies van Sliedregt
